



**Statement by Ambassador Khalil Hashmi, Permanent  
Representative of Pakistan to the UN and CD in Geneva  
at the UNGA First Committee Thematic Debate on  
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction  
(19 October 2022)**

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**Mr. Chairman,**

We align ourselves with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Within the broader international arms control architecture, the Conventions outlawing Biological and Chemical Weapons represent significant milestones in normative, institutional and operational terms.

Even as the BWC and CWC regimes have largely advanced their goals, both continue to face opportunities and challenges due to the rapid advances in the fields of biology and chemistry as well as their intersection with emerging technologies.

We share the concerns over the possibility of acquisition, production and use of chemical and biological materials as well as technology by non-state actors and in some cases by states as well.

We agree that sensitive technologies and materials should be adequately regulated to guard against their uses incompatible with the purposes of the BW or CW Conventions.

However, this objective cannot justify control measures, which impede legitimate uses of biological or chemical sciences, equipment and technology among States Parties for demonstrably peaceful purposes. It is vital to restore balance and even-handedness in the implementation of the export control regimes.

Non-discriminatory implementation of the BWC and CWC, national physical protection and international assistance and cooperation are key tools to prevent non-state actors from acquiring, producing or using these weapons.

We support the proposal for negotiating an international convention to combat acts of chemical and biological terrorism in the CD.

**Mr. Chairman,**

The BWC regime remains distinct even after five decades of its inception. It has registered progress in strengthening the normative framework. Its organizational and institutional arrangements have evolved. Yet, its full potential needs to be leveraged by advancing its promotional and institutional arrangements.

The next Review Conference and the forthcoming 50th anniversary of the Convention present worthwhile stock-taking and transformational opportunities to chart a vibrant roadmap for the next fifty years of the BWC regime.

The COVID-19 pandemic laid bare the fragilities of the global public health architecture including the intersecting issues of life sciences, viruses, infectious diseases. There are important lessons for the BWC regime from the pandemic i.e. the mutually reinforcing nature of its prevention and protection aspects as well as the urgency of amplifying international assistance and cooperation in the field of life sciences.

Pakistan remains committed to the full, effective and balanced implementation of the BWC. We have contributed to the Convention, including by presiding over its RevCon. We will continue to engage with the BWC community constructively.

We consider the UNSG's mechanism as an important operational tool for investigating complaints of alleged use. We view the CBMs as a tool for increasing transparency and building trust and confidence among States Parties. Neither the UNSG's mechanism nor the CBMs can substitute for assessing compliance by States Parties or the widely supported proposal for concluding a legally-binding Verification Protocol under the BWC.

We wish to note that the UNSG mechanism remains an operational tool for investigating an act after its occurrence. However, concluding a Verification Protocol would ensure that biological and toxin weapons are never developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained, thereby precluding their use by the States Parties.

**Mr. Chairman,**

Pakistan remains committed to advancing the goals of CWC. We continue to actively participate in the work of the OPCW. We firmly believe in preserving the effectiveness, objectivity and credibility of the OPCW and its verification regime. It is important to avoid distortions in the OPCW's mandate that may render it susceptible to political maneuvering.

OPCW should be strengthened to deal with the ongoing and future challenges within the confines of the CWC, while according priority to the complete destruction of declared as well as abandoned chemical weapons.

Pakistan condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances. Those responsible for such acts must be held accountable.

OPCW's role in dealing with cases of chemical weapons' use should remain fully compliant with the provisions of CWC. Extending the Secretariat's remit towards 'attribution' is inconsistent with the technical nature of its work. It is for the States Parties to consider issues of attribution in light of the technical findings of the Secretariat.

We attach high priority to CWC's provisions relating to international cooperation and assistance as well as peaceful uses of chemistry. Pakistan continues to regularly conduct CWC-related regional and international courses and events on various topics.

**Mr. Chairman,**

Access to and the use of biology and chemistry remains critical to the economies and societies of developing countries. The potential dual nature of the emerging technologies in these areas should not be used as a pretext for proscribing or restricting their availability to developing countries.

Striking a balance between addressing new risks and keeping avenues of assistance and cooperation open is essential.

**I thank you.**